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                                          Abstract 
 
In May 2007, Kuwait unilaterally dropped the dollar peg, which had been adopted 
in 2003 as a first step towards the monetary integration of GCC countries, to return to 
the previous basket peg system. The decision was motivated by the need to curb 
inflationary pressures arising from prolonged depreciation of the dollar against major 
currencies. Given the relevance of the anti-inflationary objective in this choice, this 
work will focus on the peculiarities of Kuwait’s economy in order to justify it  and 
review the dynamics of prices in the light of re-pegging to a basket, believing that its 
composition was affected by inflationary trends. To this end, an "Auto-Regressive 
Moving Average" econometric model is proposed to define the weights of currencies in 
the basket and the estimation shows that the influence of the Euro has increased during 
the last period, consistent with the goals against inflation. This is of particular 
importance to the future of the planned monetary union of the GCC countries, given the 
renewed commitment of Kuwait to be part of it, despite the existence of different 
exchange rate systems in force in other countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In December 2009 four countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) - Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar - reconfirmed their 
commitment to proceed towards monetary unification, whose 
preliminary step, to be completed by 2010, is the foundation of the Gulf 
Monetary Council, embryo of the future Central Bank1. This decision 
renewed the interest in the exchange rate regime that will distinguish the 
integrated monetary area.  
In 2003 the GCC countries pegged de jure their currencies to the 
dollar, as a first step towards the single currency, formalizing a system 
which de facto had already been in place for more than twenty years. 
Among the various reasons for this choice was also the awareness that 
pegging national currencies to the currency of a country with sound 
institutions and traditions of stability would enable the small economies 
in the area to import stability from the centre country and, consequently, 
credibility and confidence in their respective economies.  
Although the dollar peg met their expectations for a long time, since 
2002, due to unbalances in the economy of the United States and to 
divergent economic cycles in the GCC countries and the USA, it became 
a propagator of instability in the Gulf area, amplifying the inflationary 
impact of repeated increases in the price of oil. In this context, the 
economic debate began to indicate the superiority of a basket peg which 
included the currencies most used in financial and commercial 
transactions in the GCC countries, in order to stabilize the effective 
exchange rates, reduce fluctuations in trade and investment flows and 
gain a partial flexibility in the use of monetary policy. In particular, 
some empirical studies have confirmed the opportunity for the Gulf 
countries to prefer a basket peg over a dollar peg (Abed, Nuri Erbas, 
Guerami, 2003; Aleisa, Hammoudeh, Yuan, 2008; Habib, Stráský, 
2008); others have acknowledged its superiority in the case of an 
ongoing process of depreciation of the dollar (J.L.Rosmy and others, 
2007); while still others have tried to ascertain the composition and role 
                                                           
1Oman and the UAE have not ratified the agreement. Oman, in particular, in December 
2006 declared its inability to participate in the monetary union on the date originally 
scheduled for 2010, deeming the indicated fiscal constraints to be too stringent. The 
Emirates, in turn, withdrew from the agreement in May 2009 after the Council's 
decision to situate the headquarters of the Gulf Central Bank in Riyadh, rather than in 
their territory.  
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of the various currencies. Thus, the study of Aleisa, Hammoudeh, Yuan 
(2008) suggests a basket consisting of US dollars, euro and yen. With 
reference to a similar basket, Jen and Bindelli (2008) estimate the weight 
of the dollar to be 70% and that of the yen and the euro 15%. 
Considering the use of different currencies in trade and financial flows 
and in the composition of official reserves, Saidi, Scacciavillani, Prasad 
and Ali propose a basket consisting of 45% dollars, 30% euro, 20% yen 
and 5% pounds (2008).  
Our study follows this line of research, but differs from others as it 
focuses on the concrete experience of a country, Kuwait, which, after a 
brief experience of dollar peg, in May 2007 returned to the previous 
basket peg system, motivating its choice through the inflationary effects 
related to the exclusive link to the dollar. In the context of Kuwait’s 
renewed commitment in December 2009 to participate in the monetary 
union, its decisions regarding the exchange rate system, different from 
those of the other countries in the area, gain great importance for the 
future of the planned integration and require careful examination of the 
reasons underneath which can give useful guidelines to the other 
economies of the GCC.  
Given the importance of the anti-inflationary goal in the country’s 
decision, this work focuses on the peculiarities of Kuwait’s economy 
that explain its decision and reviews the dynamics followed by prices in 
the light of re-pegging to a basket, believing that its composition has 
influenced the inflationary trends and was, in turn, influenced by them. 
Since the Central Bank of Kuwait did not disclose either the weights nor 
the currencies comprising the basket, this study estimate them through 
an Auto-Regressive Moving Average econometric model, that shows that 
in the period of our analysis the weight of the euro has increased, in 
order to adapt the composition of the basket to the inflationary goal.  
 
 
2. The inflationary process in the GCC countries 
 
After two decades of substantial price stability, at the beginning of the 
new millennium, the GCC economies have been characterized by rapid 
and significant inflationary processes. The average inflationary rate, 
measured by the consumer price index, in all GCC member countries, 
rose from 0.2 % between 1998 and 2002 to 10.8% in 2008, with peaks 
recorded in Qatar (15%), the UAE (12.3%), Oman (12.6%) and Kuwait 
(10.5%). In Saudi Arabia, where inflation has always been under 1%, an 
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increase in the consumer prices has been witnessed since 2006, leading 
to an inflationary rate of about 10% in 2008 (Fig. 1). 
 
 
Fig.1 – Inflation Rates in the GCC countries 1 
 
Source: IMF, Regional Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia 
1 Legend:  SA (Saudi Arabia); BA (Bahrain); KU (Kuwait); OM (Oman); QA 
(Qatar); UAE (United Arab Emirates); 
 
 
Several internal and international factors combined to fuel the 
inflationary process. 
Among the internal ones, a key role was played by the growth in 
public spending and investments, facilitated by higher oil revenues 
stemming from the increase in demand and the prices of hydrocarbons. 
Higher investments, mainly in real estate, construction and services, 
have triggered income multiplication processes and increased demand 
for consumer goods that could not be promptly met by the supply. 
Inflationary pressures were, however, accentuated by the strong 
immigration flows that have accompanied the growth process and that 
raised the price of rents and fed speculative bubbles in real estate.  
External factors also contributed to the increase in prices. Thus, 
between 2006 and 2008, the international increase in food prices heavily 
influenced inflationary dynamics in the economies of the area which are 
major importers of agricultural products and foodstuffs, due to their arid 
climate and scarcity of arable land and water. Similarly, the rising prices 
of raw materials, particularly iron and copper, have triggered cost and 
price hikes in the construction sector. 
Several studies have attempted to isolate and quantify the 
contribution of the different components of inflation with reference to 
the entire area (S. Al-Qudsi and others, 2008; E. Woertz and others, 
2008; N. Saidi and others, 2009) or individual countries (M. Hasan, H. 
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Alogeel, 2008; M. Kandil, H. Morsy, 2009). However, although several 
factors have contributed to the rise in inflation, the original exchange 
rate regime adopted by the countries of the area played a fundamental 
role. 
 
 
3. The inflationary effects of the dollar peg in GCC countries 
 
For almost thirty years, Gulf economies have formally or informally 
tied their currencies to the dollar. Oman has officially pegged the riyal to 
the US currency since 1973, while Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar and the 
UAE, despite having de jure tied their currencies to the SDR until 2001, 
de facto pegged the dollar at a fixed rate since the eighties. Even the 
Kuwaiti dinar, which was formally tied to a basket peg until 2002, has 
always shown a pronounced stability against the dollar. However, as of 
January 1, 2003, as a first step towards full monetary union, the Gulf 
countries formally adopted a dollar peg monetary regime, pledging to 
adhere to a fixed exchange rate against the dollar. Thus, at present, the 
currencies of all the countries of the Gulf area are tied to the US dollar, 
with the exception of Kuwait which, in 2007, withdrew from the 
agreement by switching to a basket peg, whose composition has not been 
revealed. 
The reasons justifying the choice of the dollar peg by the GCC 
members are manifold. 
The most frequently mentioned one focuses on the importance of oil 
as a source of foreign exchange earnings for the economies of the region. 
Since international oil prices are quoted in dollars, linking the national 
currencies to the US dollar guarantees the stability of export earnings, 
protecting them against exchange risks. On the other hand, invoicing oil 
in dollars ensures to the oil-producing countries profits in a currency 
readily convertible in financial assets in a more liquid and articulated 
international market and anchoring the national currencies to the dollar 
minimizes currency risks arising from the holding of foreign reserves 
and financial assets in dollars. 
However, there is also another important reason for choosing to link 
the Gulf currencies to the dollar. Indeed, given the delays that have 
characterized their financial, economic and institutional aspects, pegging 
national currencies to the currency of a country with strong institutions 
and traditions of stability ensures credibility and confidence to the small 
economies of the region. 
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For over twenty years, anchoring to the dollar has allowed the GCC 
countries fundamentally stable price dynamics. However, since 2002, 
worsening internal and external US economy imbalances and different 
economic cycles in the GCC countries and the United States, made the 
dollar peg a propagator of instability from the anchor country to the 
Gulf, amplifying the inflationary impact of repeated increases in the 
price of oil through the liquidity and the cost effect. 
The link with the US currency has transformed the oil surpluses 
recorded by the countries of the Gulf area in increases in the monetary 
base, preventing at the same time, the possibility to control it, due to the 
need to avoid speculative capital flows. This led to the alignment of 
GCC member interest rates to the lower US rates (Fig. 2), encouraging 
the resort to borrowing and the credit expansion, at a time when the 
rapidly growing economies of the area would have required more 
stringent monetary policies.  
 
 
Fig. 2 -  USD Libor and Inter Bank Interest Rates (3-Months)1 
 
Source:Qatar Central Bank; Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency; Kuwait Central 
Bank; UAE Central Bank; www.global-rates.com 
1
 UAE data refer to the central bank overnight interest rate. 
 
 
The increase in money supply in its broadest definition (Fig. 3), has 
thus fuelled and blunted the rise of internal tensions, which strayed into 
speculative bubbles such as those that affected the stock market and real 
estate.  
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Fig. 3 – Broad Money Growth (annual change; percent)1 
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Source: IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia 
1Broad money is defined to include non - resident deposits (M5). 
 
Besides the liquidity effect, a cost effect resulted from the 
depreciation of the dollar against the currencies of major trading partners 
of the Gulf countries and, in particular, the EU and Japan. It resulted, in 
fact, in an increase of prices in domestic currency for a wide range of 
imported goods, with significant repercussions on the costs of domestic 
production, living and wage trends. Essentially, the redistribution effects 
of inflation, in the presence of an expansion in currency circulation, 
increased the imbalance, driving hikes on the cost side.  
Rising prices, especially for food and housing, have resulted in a 
decline in real income for large sections of the population, prompting 
demands for wages increases. The highest increases have been granted 
by the public sector, enhancing the interest in state employment and 
making it more difficult for the private sector to hire domestic workers. 
Thus, the private sector’s dependence on foreign labor increased in a 
period of strong wage demands dictated by the need to defend the 
purchasing power of salaries, resulting in a gradual annual increase of 
wages (from 7% in 2005 to 11.4% in 2008) (Gulf Talent, 2009).  
Overall, then, the dollar peg, in the presence of different economic 
cycles in the GCC countries and the United States, conveyed the 
inflationary process initiated by an increase in the international oil 
demand and price into the expansion of monetary circulation that fed a 
mixed inflationary escalation, in which pressure on the cost side are 
superimposed on those on the demand side. This development fuels 
doubts on the opportunity of maintaining a strict connection between the 
currencies of the Gulf countries and the US dollar, in a context 
characterized by deep structural changes in their economies that 
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highlight the differences among them and add to the demands of 
competitiveness.  
In truth, the experiences of the seventies and eighties, which, in a 
short period of time, witnessed a drastic drop in the huge oil revenues 
accumulated after the shocks of 1973 and 1979 and the transformation of 
external and public balance surpluses into deficits, prompted the GCC 
country governments to undertake, in the late eighties, policies aimed at 
diversifying the production activities in order to reduce the weight of the 
oil sector and the dependence of economic growth on the variability of 
the oil prices. These policies have become more marked in the last 
decade. The significant oil revenues that have characterized this period 
were mostly used to accelerate the processes of diversification, 
encouraging the development of the non-oil sector at higher rates than 
that of hydrocarbons (Fig. 4);  
 
 
Fig. 4 -  Oil and Non-Oil Real GDP Growth Rates 
 
Source: IMF, Regional Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia 
 
 
However, to the extent in which the Gulf countries proceed on the 
path of diversifying their economic structures, the effects of inflation on 
the competitiveness of products not related to hydrocarbons are 
particularly important given the substantial similarity of their factor 
endowments which causes them to essentially compete in the same 
production. In reality, despite the progress made, the diversification 
process is still incomplete and has encouraged both the sectors directly 
related to oil (exploration and research, refining, marketing and 
distribution) and the heavy ones that take advantage of low energy prices 
(petrochemicals, fertilizers, aluminum, steel, iron, concrete). In this 
context, inflationary pressures raise the important question of their 
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influence on the effective real exchange rates and thus the 
competitiveness of rival producers in international markets.  
As shown in fig. 5, during the last decade, in correspondence with a 
general depreciation tendency in nominal effective exchange rates of all 
the countries of the area, in line with the dollar, effective real exchange 
rates posted divergent trends, reflecting the different extent of domestic 
inflationary imbalances. In fact, the reduction of the imbalances in Saudi 
Arabia, Oman and Bahrain were opposed by the appreciation in the 
UAE, Qatar and Kuwait. Thus, inflation has affected the competitiveness 
of the various members in different ways, threatening tensions that can 
jeopardize the objectives of the integration of the area.  
 
 
Fig. 5 – Real Effective Exchange Rates in the GCC Countries, 2000 = 
100 
 
Source: our calculations on the basis of data from the IMF (International Financial 
Statistics; IMF Country Report) 
 
 
Due to the relevance of inflationary differentials in the 
competitiveness of Gulf countries and the process of their diversification 
activities, a more careful evaluation of the costs and benefits of the 
dollar peg is needed. This need becomes greater in view of a future 
monetary union. In the absence of unification, the single countries can 
severe their close link with the dollar if it becomes expensive; after the 
monetary union it will be more difficult to do so unilaterally. 
Considerations of this nature justify to the decision of Kuwait to drop 
the dollar peg in 2007 and return to the pre-existing basket peg system.  
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4. The cost of the dollar peg for the economy of Kuwait 
 
The tendency to consider GCC economies as substantially 
homogeneous is widespread. In fact, they seem to share several features: 
small size, limited population, shared language and culture, an arid 
climate and shortage of water affecting the possibilities of the 
agricultural sector, great importance of the oil sector, large trade 
openness, high incidence of migrant labor on the population and the 
overall labor force, substantial population growth rates. However, behind 
the apparent uniformity, the advancement of the diversification process 
has given greater importance to their relative differences in the 
availability of oil and natural gas resources, importance of the oil sector, 
levels of income per capita; labor market, demographic growth and 
budgetary constraints. 
These differences may make some countries particularly vulnerable to 
the effects of inflationary pressures, requiring careful evaluation of the 
effects of the exchange rate regime to be adopted. This need is 
particularly felt in Kuwait, given its specificity regarding: a) the 
structure of the production activity; b) labor market and demographic 
growth; c) foreign trade and financial relations. 
 
a) The economic structure. 
 Kuwait is the GCC country that has the greatest dependence on the 
oil sector. It posts, in fact, the highest percentage of oil exports on the 
total (95%) and of oil revenues on the total public ones (93.8%); while it 
is ranked after Qatar for the weight of hydrocarbon production on GDP 
(59.3%). Moreover, the high relevance of oil revenues on exports 
justifies the sharp incidence of the current account balance on GDP 
(43.73%), which appears to be the highest in the area. 
These data are explained through the characteristics of the 
diversification process implemented in the country, which has mainly 
focused on the exploitation of oil resources, fostering the creation of a 
comprehensive and advanced industrial infrastructure dependent on oil. 
This led to deepening the dual nature of the country’s economic 
structure, pitting a modern oil sector, controlled by the state and by a few 
large families, against a traditional and obsolete sector mainly managed 
by private individuals. 
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Fig. 6 - Relevance of the Oil Sector on the Economic Structure of the 
Kuwait (2008, % values)1 
 
Source: Central Bank of Kuwait, Quarterly Bulletin, 2009 
1 Legend: OEx/TEx (Oil Export/Total Export), OR/TR (Government Oil Revenue / 
Total Government Revenue); OP/GDP (Oil Production/GDP); CC/GDP (Current 
Account Balance / GDP). 
 
 
The strong dependence on the oil sector makes the economy of 
Kuwait particularly vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the oil market, by 
tying its growth to oil demand and price trends. Thus, sudden drops in 
price may cause recessionary effects, while rapid and large increases 
may encourage appreciation of the real exchange rate, which could 
jeopardize the competitiveness of the non-oil sector and the needs of 
diversification. The costs of the previous effect, known in literature as 
Dutch Disease, can be amplified by the dollar peg. Indeed, the higher 
incidence of oil exports on total exports, in the presence of increases in 
oil prices, favors large surpluses in the current account balance, that the 
dollar peg can turn into higher monetary circulation, amplifying the 
inflationary effects of the increase of the oil price. It is no coincidence, 
in this regard, that in the past decade the weight of the current account 
balance to GDP in Kuwait consistently exceeded that of other economies 
of the area. The risks associated with a close link with the dollar in the 
presence of economic structures heavily dependent on the oil sector 
cannot be overlooked, especially when considered in the light of 
Kuwait’s demographics and labor market, which complicate the effects 
of inflation.  
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b) The labor market 
Kuwait is a small country with an area of about 17,818 sq km and a 
population of over 3,441,800 inhabitants: Kuwaitis compose 32% and 
immigrants 68%. Similar proportions characterize the labor market. In 
fact, given the scarcity of the national population, the development of the 
oil sector and the diversification of the production process were made 
possible thanks to strong inflows of foreign workers, composing today 
84% of the total labor force (fig.7). Thanks to the contributions of 
workers coming from India, Pakistan, Philippines, Egypt, Lebanon and 
Jordan, Kuwait was able to initiate a process of substantial development 
with growth rates above 7% on average for the 2002 -2008 period (IMF, 
Regional Economic Outlook), and an unemployment rate at the end of 
2008 of 1.82%, resulting from the average rate of 5.33% for the Kuwaiti 
labor force and 1.13% for foreigners (Institute of Banking Studies, 
2009). 
 
 
Fig.7 – Percentage distribution of population and labor force 
according to nationality ad work sector (31.12. 2008) 1 
 
Source: Institute of Banking Studies – Kuwait, Research Unit, 
Economic and Financial Data Base for Bankers, 2009 
1 Legend: NKU/TP (Non-kuwaiti/Total Population); NKU/TLF (Non-
kuwaiti/Total Labor Force); KUGSLF/TKULF (Kuwaiti Labor Force in 
Government Sector/Total Kuwaiti Labor Force); NKUPrLF/TNKULF (Non 
Kuwaiti Labor Force in Private Sector/Total Non Kuwaiti Labor Force). 
 
 
The strong dependence on foreign labor, in the presence of low 
unemployment rates, markedly affects the prospects of growth of the 
country, depending on the ability to continue to dispose of them. In 
reality, workers tend to concentrate in the Kuwaiti public sector, both 
because the employment opportunities offered by the private sector are 
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either too humble or too specialized to be compatible with an essentially 
humanistic cultural education, and because of the higher wages and 
benefits offered by the public sector, where, moreover, preferential 
recruitment policies for national workers apply. This phenomenon is 
common to all the countries of the area, though it tends to assume its 
highest representation in Kuwait, where 82% of Kuwaitis are employed 
in the public sector and approximately 94% of foreigners in the private 
sector. The non-Kuwaitis are preferred by entrepreneurs for their 
willingness to accept lower wages and the greater ease of dismissing 
them.  
Thus, migration, despite having secured a flexible global labor 
market, also promoted its segmentation that impedes the movement of 
domestic and foreign workers between the public and private sector and 
rests the continuing process of diversification on the possibility of 
attracting foreign labor without losing the advantages of flexibility. In 
this context, the inflationary effects of the dollar peg may be particularly 
relevant for the country’s economy. The redistributive effects are 
dumped, in fact, on a population and a workforce characterized by a 
predominance of non-Kuwaitis, with the risk of arousing, in addition to 
demands for wage increases, a climate of tension and intolerance. In 
Kuwait, moreover, the redistributive effects of inflation on the labor 
market are exacerbated by the structure of its trade flows. 
 
c)  Trade flows 
For economies like that of Kuwait - small and open to foreign trade - 
trade relations count on and promote the choice of an exchange rate 
regime that reduces transaction costs, related to the conversion of 
currency and foreign exchange risk. This requires careful consideration 
of the direction and composition of trade flows. 
With reference to the direction of trade, the main areas of origin of 
Kuwaiti imports are Asia and Europe (fig. 8): in fact, about 25% of 
Kuwait’s imports come from Western European countries, surpassing 
those from the United States (11%) and ranking second to those from the 
Asian area (38%); whereas Europe is a small partner in terms of exports. 
A significant flow of Kuwaiti exports, amounting to 7% of the total, 
goes, in fact, to only four EMU countries (the Netherlands, Belgium, 
France and Spain). The main market of destination of Kuwaiti goods is, 
however, Asia and, in particular, Japan, Korea, India, Singapore and 
China (fig. 9).  
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With reference to the composition of trade flows, hydrocarbons are 
the main export item, with an impact on the total that exceeds 95% and 
is mainly directed to Asian countries. Imports, however, consist mainly 
in foodstuffs, manufactured goods and machinery and come mostly from 
European countries. 
 
 
Fig. 8 - Imports of Kuwait According to Country or to Region of 
 origin, 2007  
 
Source: our calculations on the basis of data 
from the CBK, Quarterly Bullettin, 
1Non including UK 
 
 
Fig. 9 - Exports of Kuwait According to Country or to Region of 
Destination, 2008 
 
Source: our calculations on the basis of data from the IMF 
1Including Pakistan, Indonesia,Bangladesh, Thailand, Malaysia 
2Including only Netherlands, France, Spain, Italy 
 
 
In this context, the phenomenology of exchange rate system is 
particularly important. Indeed, the foreign currency revenues related to 
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exports are mainly in dollars, both because the hydrocarbons are quoted 
in the US currency, and because they are widely used as a transaction 
currency in the Asian economies. On the contrary, the payment of their 
imports is largely in euro, given the current practice in European 
countries to list their exports in their national currency. The relations of 
exchange between the euro and the dollar have, therefore, great 
importance for the countries of the Gulf area and, in the last decade, in 
the presence the dollar peg, they caused huge monetary losses due to the 
depreciation trend of the US currency compared to the euro that has 
characterized most of this period. 
The depreciation of the dollar against the euro, moreover, implying 
also that of the dinar, has led to rising prices in domestic currencies for 
goods imported from the EU. This is an effect that is particularly 
relevant for the economies such as the Kuwaiti: small; open to 
international trade; highly specialized in the production of hydrocarbons; 
with a segmented labor market characterized by the significant incidence 
of foreign workers; with limited agricultural production and 
manufacturing, which forces them to import a large share of their 
consumer goods, raw materials, intermediate inputs and capital goods. 
The classification of imports on the basis of their economic use 
demonstrates that the purchase of foreign consumer goods and 
intermediate products are respectively 39% and 40% of total imports 
(Central Bank of Kuwait, Quarterly Bulletin). In this context, the pass-
through effect can be particularly burdensome for Kuwait, resulting in 
increased costs of production and consumer prices. In this regard, the 
high incidence of imported products in the wholesale price index, 
estimated at 769.18‰, is significant (Central Bank of Kuwait). 
In considering consumer prices, equally important is the country's 
high dependence on imported agricultural products and foodstuffs, 
which constitute about 26% of imports of consumer goods (Central Bank 
of Kuwait). In fact, the country’s arid climate, the scarcity of arable land 
and the high rates of population growth make the domestic supply fall 
short of domestic needs, forcing them to buy significant quantities of 
foodstuffs from abroad, particularly Asia and Europe. As they occupy an 
important place in the population’s consumption, about 200‰, an 
increase in import prices caused by the depreciation of the dollar, in 
dollar peg conditions, can drive their prices up, worsening the living 
conditions of the working classes, and especially of migrant workers, 
fueling demands for higher wages and social tensions.  
 
 16
5. The experience of re-pegging to the basket 
 
On May 20, 2007, Kuwait unilaterally withdrew its commitment to 
peg its currency to the dollar, made in 2002 as a first step towards the 
monetary integration of the GCC countries, and restored the pre-existing 
basket peg regime, anchoring the dinar to a basket of currencies, whose 
composition and weights were not disclosed. The decision was 
motivated by the need to curb inflationary pressures arising from the 
prolonged depreciation of the dollar against major currencies, although, 
unlike other area coin, the dinar was allowed to fluctuate within margins 
of ± 3.5% around the declared parity of 299.63 fils per dollar2. 
Given the importance that the anti-inflationary objective has taken in 
the choice of the exchange rate regime, it is interesting to review the 
dynamics followed by prices after the re-pegging to the basket in the 
light of that choice, although we are fully aware that other important 
variables have heavily influenced its development in recent years. 
As shown in Fig. 10, in 2007-2009, inflation and dollar-dinar 
exchange rates have moved in an essentially antithetical manner, 
featuring two different sub-periods: in the first (2007- July, 2008), the 
revaluation of the dinar against the dollar has been accompanied by an 
accentuation of inflationary pressures; in the second (July 2008 - 2009), 
the depreciation has been associated with their moderation.  
 
 
Fig. 10 - Inflation Rates and Exchange Rates, 2007-2009  (quarterly 
values) 
 
Source: Central Bank of Kuwait, Quarterly Bulletin 
                                                           
2
 One Kuwaiti dinar equals to 1,000 fils 
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From 2007 to mid 2008, the dinar has consistently appreciated against 
the dollar. Appreciation was accentuated after abandoning the dollar peg 
and reached its peak in July 2008. Overall, during the period from May 
2007 to July 2008, the dinar appreciated by more than 8 %, from 288.27 
to 265.27 fils per dollar. In the same period, contrary to expectations, 
inflation has significantly accelerated: the quarterly rates of variation in 
the consumer price index have risen consistently, from 0.69% in the 
second quarter of 2007 to 4.2% in the first quarter of 2008. Overall, the 
cumulative increase in prices during that period was more than 10%.  
Since the second half of 2008, these trends are reversed. The dinar 
started to depreciate against the dollar by more than 10% between July 
2008 (265.27 fils) and March 2009 (291.87 fils), while the quarterly 
rates of growth in the index of consumer prices rose in same period from 
1.8% to 0.5%. 
Some explanations have been given to justify these trends: what 
happened in the first period was attributed to the uncertainty that 
accompanied the decision to abandon the dollar peg; while the trend of 
the second period was attributed to economic policy decisions aiming at 
supporting the continuation of the growth process. 
With reference to the first period, in particular, the burst of 
inflationary pressures, despite the appreciation of the dinar against the 
dollar, was motivated by the lack of transparency that has characterized 
the introduction of the basket peg. According to a widespread opinion, 
the failure to disclose the composition of the basket and the weights of 
currencies created a climate of uncertainty that fueled expectations of a 
revaluation of the dinar and speculative pressures, with a consequent 
influx of capital from abroad. The need to contain the pressure towards 
appreciation of the national currency has pushed down interest rates, 
encouraging the resort to borrowing, the expansion of circulation credit 
and inflationary pressures (M.S. Khan, 2008). 
With reference to the second period, the coexistence of the 
depreciation of the dollar with the easing of inflationary pressures was 
attributed to a deliberate economic policy strategy aimed at curbing the 
spread of the recessionary effects resulting from the international 
economic and financial crisis. The depreciation of the dinar, in fact, 
could have increased the revenues in national currency resulting from oil 
exports, thus facilitating investments in public activities supporting the 
national economy in the presence of a decline in global demand 
(Reuters, 2009). 
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While agreeing with the above explanations, we believe that also the 
re-pegging to the basket and the variations of its composition may have 
influenced the observed trends in exchange rates and prices. This 
impression is based on the strong resemblance, visually ascertainable, 
characterizing the monthly trend of the dollar-dinar exchange rate and 
the dollar-euro one in the period 2007-2009. As shown in Fig.11, the 
dynamics of the exchange rate of the dollar compared to the dinar tends 
to reproduce that of the dollar-euro exchange rate, justifying the 
possibility that the weight of the euro in the basket may have affected the 
relationship between the Kuwaiti and US currencies. In fact, the 
correlation coefficient we estimated between the two series,  exchange 
rate dollar-euro and dollar-dinar, is positive and equal to 0.5997 and 
gives some foundation to the previous opinion.  
 
 
Fig. 11 - Exchange rate dollar-euro and dollar-dinar 
 
 Source: Central Bank of Kuwait, Quarterly Bulletin 
 
 
The next part of this work proposes an econometric estimation that 
aims at verifying the composition of the basket and its possible changes 
in the belief that the weight of the euro in the basket may have had some 
influence on price trends observed more recently. Obviously, it is clear 
that the narrowness of the survey period and the concurrence of a set of 
variables closely related to a period of deep uncertainty and imbalances 
in the international and Kuwaiti economies don’t allow a precise 
estimate of the impact of the basket changes on inflation dynamics.  
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6. The estimation of weights and the econometric model 
 
The estimation of the weights of the currencies making up the 
currency basket of Kuwait is conducted, with appropriate changes, on an 
approach devised by Frankel (1993) and Frankel and Wei (1994, 1995), 
based on the ordinary least square regression (OLS) for the exchange 
rate of domestic currency compared to those in the basket and which the 
two economists propose when it is anchored to a basket with limited 
flexibility 3. In later studies they developed a new and more appropriate 
approach for basket pegging where exchange rates fluctuate around a 
stated fixed rate and where, in addition to the estimated weights of the 
currencies, there is also the need to evaluate the flexibility de facto of the 
exchange rate compared to the central parity. 4 In the case of Kuwait, 
however, the original method is preferred since former analyses 
conducted again by Frankel and Wei through the new approach, with 
reference to the eighties of last century, estimated a coefficient 
concerning the flexibility of the central exchange rate close to zero, in 
line with the classification de facto of exchange systems implemented by 
the International Monetary Fund, which defines the one of Kuwait as a 
"conventional pegged arrangement to a composite" (IMF, 2009).  
In this case, moreover, besides the weights, the currencies composing 
the basket should also be identified since the Central Bank of Kuwait has 
not disclosed its composition. This, however, can be reconstructed on the 
basis of the relevance of the major currencies financing the country’s 
imports. Data provided by the Institute of Banking Studies of Kuwait 
(2009) reveal in order of importance: the dollar, concerning 60.7 % of 
imports in 2007; the euro, with an incidence of 11.3 %  and the yen with 
8.4 %. Thus, it is realistic to suppose that these currencies are included 
in the country’s basket. Moreover, it is appropriate to include also the 
British pound. Indeed, despite its low weight in the financing of imports 
(0.9 %), it is probably used in financial transactions, given the broad 
                                                           
3
 The same technique was subsequently employed by Bénassy-Quéré-Agnès (1999), 
Ohno (1999), Frankel, Schmukler, Servén (2001), Benassy, Quéré, Coeur, Mignon 
(2004). It also has been recently used by Eichengreen (2006), Shah, Zeleis and Patnaik 
(2005); E. Ogawa, T. Yoshimi (2008) to verify the weight of the currencies that make 
up the basket peg of China. 
4
 A new contribution has been recently proposed by Frankel and Xie (2010) for the 
case when the countries do not maintain a single consistent regime for more than a few 
years at a time, but rather switch parameters every few years and even switch regimes. 
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relevance of the London financial market. The Swiss franc, instead, 
given its limited use in the country’s commercial trade, is used as a 
constant to measure the variability of the exchange rate of the dinar 
against the currencies composing the basket5.  
With these clarifications the original regression model of Frankel and 
Wei becomes as follows: 
 
∆lnyDinar/FRsv= α+β1∆ lneUSD/FRsv+ β2∆lneJPY/FRsv+β3∆ lneERsv/FRsv+  
+β4∆lnepound/FRsv          (1) 
 
 
In it: 
 
- ∆lny
 Dinar/FRsv,, ∆lne USD/FRsv,,∆lneJPY/FRsv,,∆ lneERsv/FRsv,, ∆ lnepound/FRsv 
represent, respectively, the exchange rate of the dinar, the dollar, 
the yen, the euro and the pound against the Swiss franc6;  
- coefficients ß are the weights of the respective currencies in the 
basket. The closer the coefficient is to 1, the greater is the tie 
between the dinar and the currency taken into account; 
- regression is based on first differences of logarithms of exchange 
rates:7 
- it is also assumed that the standard error is close to zero and R2 is 
near the unit. 
 
However, the above model seems to ignore the modern econometric 
contributions in time series. Indeed, the time series on exchange rates, 
even in studies on the percentage changes, do not always represent the 
result of a stationary process8. Several tests on the regression model 
                                                           
5
 Frankel and Wei (1994, 2006), Ohno (1999) and Eichengreen (2006) have used the 
Swiss franc as the constant; Benassy Quéré (1999) the dollar Yamazaki (2006), the 
Canadian dollar. Subsequent contributions (Frankel and Wei, 2007) are regarded a 
basket of currencies as a constant, such as, for example, the Special Drawing Rights.  
6
 In particular, if the fluctuations of the dinar against the franc are largely explained by 
those of the dollar against the Swiss currency we can deduce the existence of a close 
anchorage between the Kuwaiti and the US currencies. 
7
 Frankel and Wei (2006) have carried out a logarithmic analysis motivated by the need 
to reduce the standard error for each value of the coefficients obtained and to analyze 
stochastic processes through a linear model. 
8
 A more estensive discussion on estimate in time series is present in R. Lucchetti 
(2008). 
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outlined by Equation (1) - from Durbin-Watson’s to Ljung-Box’s-, and 
the observation of the correlogram could highlight some issues related to 
autocorrelation especially among the residuals9. 
For these reasons, in our work we believe it best to integrate 
Frankel’s OLS model with an Auto-Regressive Moving Average10 
approach supported by the Kalman filter11, requiring the use of 
logarithmic difference of each variable (∆d.ln). Furthermore, given the 
volatility that normally characterizes the daily exchange rates, we also 
included the Hodrick-Prescott filter in the analysis as a method of 
leveling the time series, absent in previous contributions12. 
With these changes our regression model takes the following form: 
 
∆d.lnyDinar/FRsv= α+β1∆d.lneUSD/FRsv+ β2∆d.lneJPY/FRsv+β3∆d.lneERsv/FRsv+      
+  β4∆d.lnepound/FRsv + µ t                                                                                                       (2) 
 
whose decomposition in time series for each explanatory is: 
 
α
 0,t= α0,t-1+ŋ0,t 
β1,t= β 1,t-1+ŋ1,t 
β2,t= β2, t-1+ŋ2,t 
β3,t= β 3, t-1+ŋ3,t 
β3,t= β 4, t-1+ŋ3,t 
 
and it is analyzed in an autoregressive moving average (ARMA).   
Based on this amended model, the estimation of the weights of the 
currency basket of Kuwait is conducted with reference to three different 
periods: 2000-2003, June 2007-July 2008, August 2008-February 
201013.  
                                                           
9
 For a more detailed examination of these issues, see M. Mele (2009) 
10For the analysis we used two econometric software: Stata SE ver.11A; Gretl ver.1.8.4. 
11
 McKinnon (2002) and Ogawa (2006) used the Kalman filter to estimate basket peg 
regimes in Southeastern Asia. However, it has been used to a simple OLS model where 
the coefficients assumed temporal variations. 
12
 Analysis in Appendix. 
13
 Obviously the period 2003- May 2007 is not considered because it is one in which 
Kuwait has formally adopted the dollar peg. 
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The first period is the one preceding the decision of Kuwait to adopt the 
dollar-peg; the second, following the re-pegging to the basket, includes 
the period of appreciation of the dinar against the dollar, which reached 
its peak in July 2008, and accentuation of inflationary pressures; the 
third period includes the phase of depreciation of the Kuwaiti currency 
against the US one and the mitigation in price increases. Regarding the 
data, the first series uses monthly data, while the second and third use 
daily data (maximum 5 days). The data were drawn from the Pacific 
Exchange Rate Service  2010
 
and then estimated through a model "AR-
MA (2;2)"  
 
 
7. Results 
 
 
Model: ARMAX (2;2) –dependent variable: Dinar-; S.E. based on Hessian; 
estimated using Kalman’s filter (exact MV) 
 
 
*** p<0.01 ;  ** p<0.05; *p<0.1 
 
 
 
From the results of the informative criteria, it is shown that the 
ARMA-"Kalman" model (2,2) presents for its similar values, therefore, 
doesn't differentiate itself. The model, moreover, doesn't demonstrate 
common factors, confirming the reliability of the data obtained: an 
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estimation of the robust initial type, it has permitted moreover to limit 
the effect of the heteroschedasticity of the model, therefore avoiding an 
ARCH analysis. 
The values of R2 adjusted for each regression (developed in the initial 
OLS model) range from 89% to 98%, indicating that the explanatory 
variables justify well the dependant variables; standard errors of 
regressions showed values close to zero, with a maximum value of 
0.002611. Finally, analyzing the respective charts of the correlogram of 
residues the estimate for each period does not reveal any autocorrelation. 
Analysis of the coefficients for the three analyzed periods clearly 
shows that the weight of the considered currencies (dollar, euro, yen and 
pound sterling) has changed over time.  
In the first period, 2000-2003, the currencies whose weight is 
significant in the basket (from the analysis of the p-value) - besides the 
constant- are the dollar and euro, whose coefficient is respectively 0.89 
and 0.04. It is obvious that the influence of the European currency on the 
Kuwaiti dinar is almost nil, and this may be due to its still young life. 
In the second period, June 2007 - July 2008, only the US currency is 
significant. Moreover the value of its coefficient is about 0.6, and the R2 
is 0.8996. Although in May 2007, Kuwait officially came under a basket 
peg, in the period under review it actually continued to closely peg the 
dinar to the dollar and this may have contributed to worsen the 
inflationary trends, leading to a change in the composition of the basket. 
The almost exclusive relationship with the dollar may, in fact, have 
intensified the expansion of the monetary circulation related to inflows 
of speculative capital that followed the de-pegging.  
The results change dramatically when we analyze the latest period, 
August 2008-February 2010. In this period, the only currencies that 
appear to compose the basket are the dollar and the euro. However, 
while the weight of the US currency falls from 0.89 of the first period to 
0.81 of the third, that of the European currency rises from 0.04 to 0.16. 
There are therefore strong presumptions supporting the impression that 
the inflationary consequences of the link with the dollar may have led 
Kuwait to increase the weight of the euro in its basket.  
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8. Conclusion 
 
For economies such as those of the Gulf - small, highly specialized in 
a few productions and open to foreign trade - the commercial and 
financial relations matter and make it particularly appropriate to consider 
the choice of an exchange rate regime that is not a vehicle of inflationary 
pressures and reduces transaction costs related to currency conversion 
and exchange risks. In the new millennium the dollar peg has not 
complied with these requirements. In the presence of diverging 
economic cycles in the GCC countries and the United States, it has 
amplified the inflationary impulses initiated by the increasing 
international demand for oil and its rising price, through a liquidity and a 
cost effect.  
Awareness of the inflationary consequences of the dollar peg has thus 
cast doubt on the opportunity to maintain a rigid link between the Gulf 
and the US currencies, in a context characterized by deep structural 
changes in the economies of the region, which would highlight the 
differences between them and add to the demands of competitiveness. 
Doubts on the benefits of pegging to the dollar have been more 
relevant for Kuwait, taking into account the peculiarities of its 
production structure and the characteristics of its labor market, which 
tend to increase the inflationary effects of the dollar peg. In fact, given 
its heavy dependence on the hydrocarbon sector and the high incidence 
of oil exports on the total, the link with the dollar may boost the 
expansionary effects of oil surpluses on monetary circulation. On the 
other hand, the marked prevalence of immigrants in the total population 
and labor force, low unemployment rates and the preference of Kuwaitis 
for public employment, tend to exaggerate the redistributive effects of 
inflation, increasing the risk of wage demands and social tensions. 
In this context, the choice of Kuwait to peg the dinar to a basket of 
currencies widely used in trade and finance is perfectly justified in terms 
of economic logic. It is consistent with the requirement that the 
definition of the exchange rate takes also into account the direction and 
intensity of trade and financial flows on the international market. In 
other words, the weight of currencies in anchor peg exchange rate 
regimes should reflect the structure of foreign economic and financial 
relations. In this respect, therefore, the decision of Kuwait to include the 
euro in its basket and increase its weight is fully justified, given the 
importance of the European currency in its economic and financial trade.  
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The experience of Kuwait is a useful example for other GCC 
economies which, despite their close relations with the euro countries, 
neglect their money in their own exchange rate systems. The importance 
of their trade with EU countries suggests, in fact, the opportunity to 
increase the weight of the euro in their systems. Anchoring to a basket 
peg that includes the euro could bring undeniable benefits: firstly, 
reducing the dependence of the monetary circulation of the GCC 
economies from the US monetary policy choices; secondly, limiting the 
fluctuations in effective exchange rates of national currencies and the 
risks linked to renewed appreciation processes of the euro against the 
dollar.  
However, at present, the choice of Kuwait to anchor the dinar to a 
basket peg raises important questions about the future of the planned 
monetary union. Indeed, although justified in terms of economic logic, 
this choice differs from that of other partners who continue to adopt a 
dollar peg. 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Fig 1 (logarithmic differences of the variables) 
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Fig 2 (Hodrick & Prescott filter-lamda=100) 
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